Thursday, October 3, 2013

COLD HARBOR


As Grant’s Overland Campaign continued, he moved his army southeasterly toward Richmond, the Confederate Capitol, with the thought that capturing this city would bring an end to the war. The problem he encountered was the determination and stamina of General Lee’s Rebels.

Although neither army won the previous two major battles – Spotsylvania and the Wilderness – the conflicts benefitted the Northerners more as the casualties depleted the Southern troops while the Yankees simply refilled their ranks. General Grant understood that attrition would eventually win the war and preserve the Union.

After battles and skirmishes at North Anna River and Totopotomoy Creek following Spotsylvania, Lee, although unable to stop Grant, did manage to slow down his progress in his march to Richmond. Grant, at this point, realized the importance of the crossroads at Old Cold harbor.

On May 31, 1864 Grant sent Major General Phillip Sheridan’s cavalry to take the crossroads. Sheridan encountered a Confederate cavalry here and as the conflict grew, it was joined by Rebel infantry. The Union eventually drove the Confederate troops off and the Rebels dug in southwest of this location. The following day as the Southern troops grew, Lee ordered his army to attack the Union forces but was again unsuccessful. Encouraged by the actions of his troopers, Grant ordered up additional troops and decided on a full scale attack knowing if he could break through the Confederate lines he had a direct route to Richmond. After temporarily breaking through, the Federals were repulsed and the fighting ended for the day.

Due to a misguided march by troops, the condition of his troops, and several postponements for an attack, Grant lost the next day – June 2. This delay gave Lee the opportunity to dig in with an excellent zigzag of breastworks along a six mile front.

 The morning of the 3rd saw the Union, at 50,000 strong, launch an assault on these well-manned, well-placed breastworks which were supported by artillery. They were required to traverse open fields and slopes to reach the Confederate strongholds. Needless to say, it was a slaughter field. The Federals, with no place to hide, were cut down like target practice. Unable to move forward and unable to retreat, many soldiers lay on the ground and using bayonets, cups, plates, and canteens dug what protection they could waiting for night to fall. This day alone saw nearly 6,000 Union troops killed or wounded, most within one hour’s time.

The battle was over. The next four days, Grant and Lee negotiated a truce in order to collect the hundreds of wounded from the battlefield, but by then most had not survived. From June 4 through June 12, both sides traded artillery fire, sniper fire, fortified their positions, and incurred minor attacks. This battlefield became a siege battle.

All in all, the Federals suffered 12,000 casualties while the Southerners incurred almost 4,000 in the two weeks of battle following Spotsylvania.

The frontal assault that General Grant ordered on June 3 was, I believe, the only maneuver that he was said to have regretted.

Grant pulled his forces from the field on the night of the 12th and moved south to cross the James River with the intent of capturing the City of Petersburg, a great rail hub for the South. Taking this rail hub would severely cripple the Rebels efforts by cutting off their supplies. Thus began the long and arduous siege of Petersburg. The beginning of the end for the Confederate States.

General Lee would win no more major battles following his success at Cold Harbor. His army would be stretched thin in the defense of both Richmond and Petersburg which lay only 10 miles apart. They would be required to entrench in excess of 35 miles from Richmond’s east side south and west around Petersburg in order to stop Grant and attempt to protect both cities.