After failing to defeat The Army of
Northern Virginia during his Overland Campaign in 1864, Union General Ulysses
S. Grant moved his forces across the James River at City Point (now called
Hopewell) and proceeded in his attempt to capture Richmond by taking and going
through Petersburg. Knowing that if he could close off all the supply routes
for the Confederates, he could squeeze them into submission. Petersburg was the
great rail hub serving not only Richmond, but General Lee’s entire Rebel Army.
Following his failure at Cold Harbor,
the Union army, under the cover of darkness, marched south to the James River. After
crossing, Grant threw his troops against Petersburg from June 15th through the
18th. Because the Federal
commanders under Grant did not press their positions and take the city, Lee was
given enough time to move his army south to defend this important location. With
the failed attempt on the Union’s part came a 292 day siege of Petersburg. This
effort to take the city produced over 37 miles of entrenchments dug by each
army, numerous battles, attacks, counter attacks, skirmishes, sharpshooters
efforts, shelling of the city of Petersburg and its civilians, starvation of
the Rebel forces, and casualties numbering 70,000.
Lee was, once again, numerically
outnumbered. He was forced to leave troops to guard and protect Richmond, moving
the larger portion south to face Grant, stop the attacks on Petersburg, and
protect the many rail lines and roads that carried supplies to his troops. The
problem for Lee was that Grant outnumbered him nearly 2 to 1. As Grant extended
his line of troops southward around the eastern side of Petersburg and to cut
off railroads, Lee would have to match his movement with a lesser number of
men. Grant would move south and west. Lee would mirror his movement and dig in
to keep Petersburg behind him and try to salvage rail lines. Grant would extend
his line again, and Lee would do the same so that Grant could not turn the
Rebel right flank. The process would happen time and time again. The difference
was that Lee was continually thinning his troops to keep pace with Grant’s
movements. This would, obviously, weaken Lee’s defenses as the Union grip would
tighten. As everyone knew, it was now just a matter of time. 
Along the eastern front of the
entrenchments occurred the Battle of the Crater and the taking of Fort Stedman
by the confederates, albeit only temporarily. In addition to these two major
conflicts, there were constant sniper attacks along with artillery and rifle
action. In many locations these trenches were yards, and sometimes only feet,
apart.
The Crater Battle was a unique and
unusual effort on the part of the Union troops. Opposite Lee’s lines was a
brigade from the coal mining region of Pennsylvania that believed they could
tunnel under the Rebel fortification known as Elliott’s Salient, plant explosives,
and blow up that portion of the Confederate line thus giving the Federals
direct access to Petersburg. Under the
command of Union General Ambrose Burnside, famous for his catastrophic blunder
at Fredericksburg and his ineptness at the stone bridge at Antietam, he
approved the tunneling plan presented to him by Lt. Col. Pleasants. Simply
stated, the plan was to tunnel approximately 511 feet until it was under the
Rebel fortification, “T” the tunnel for 75 feet, plant 8,000 pounds of
explosives (320 kegs of gunpowder), seal the “T”, detonate the explosives, and
rush the exposed area with ample infantry to secure the breach in the
Confederate line. Generals Grant and Meade had little faith in this plan but
allowed it mainly as a means to keep the troops busy during the long and boring
siege. 
Digging began in late June. During
this time Burnside had a division of black troops trained to lead the assault.
Anticipating the devastation and carnage that would occur with this incredible
explosion, the division was instructed to not enter the crater, but to charge
on either side of the rim fanning out to secure the breach. 
Finally, on July 28, the powder charges
were armed. The attack was scheduled for
the morning hours of July 30, prior to sunrise. On the 29th, Meade
ordered Burnside not to use the black troops to lead the assault, in spite of
two weeks of intensive training. Burnside’s protest of this fell on deaf ears
and a division of white soldiers under the command of Brigadier General James
Ledlie was selected by “luck of the draw”.
With no training or instructions these men would now lead the charge
after the explosion. After some delay, the much anticipated explosion happened
just before dawn creating a massive shower of earth, men, and artillery. The
ensuing crater was 170 feet long, 100-120 feet wide, and at least 30 feet deep.
Not only were the Confederates stunned by the event, but also the lead division
of Yankees assigned for the attack. They were not briefed on what to expect or
how to react and thus just froze for a time, having never seen anything this devastating
before. The Federals took ten minutes to begin to move forward and, without the
promised planks to bridge their earthworks, had to climb in and out of trenches
before reaching no man’s land between the two lines. Not being instructed to rim
the crater; they proceeded to charge into the large hole anticipating it to be
a great rifle pit for them. Ledlie, the commander in charge of the lead
division is said to have been far behind the lines, giving no direction and
being drunk.
Being stunned by the explosion also,
which initially claimed 278 graybacks, it took Confederate Brigadier General
William Mahone one hour to rally his troops around the rim of the crater. The
following action was described as a “Turkey shoot” as the Yanks in the pit had
no cover and nowhere to run. Not understanding the plan had failed, Burnside
set the black division under Ferrero to charge the scene. Due to flanking fire
from the Southerners, Ferrero’s division was forced into the pit also. For the
next few hours, Mahone’s division accompanied by Major General Bushrod Johnson’s
men and artillery pounded the defenseless Federals trapped in the crater. It
was a massacre. Some Union soldiers did manage to climb from the pit and
temporarily push the Confederate line, but were ultimately repulsed. Late in
the battle, many of the black Union soldiers were killed by bayonet and musket
fire even after surrendering to the Confederates. The entire plan was a fiasco;
poorly executed, and halfheartedly supported by the commanding generals –
Grant, Meade, and Burnside. Casualties for the Federals amounted to nearly 4,000 while the Rebels incurred just fewer than 1,500.
The attack on Fort Stedman, on March
25th, by the Rebels was Lee’s last ditch effort to break the nine month
siege by the U.S. forces. As the siege wore on the Confederate forces
diminished due to disease, desertion, starvation, and a shortage of supplies.
By this time Lee’s troops were outnumbered by the Northerners nearly three to
one and they were stretched the same mileage of entrenchments. It’s remarkable
that the Southerners were still on the lines. Major General John B. Gordon, at
the direction of General Lee, devised a plan to attack Fort Stedman in the
early dawn hours of March 23rd. Selecting Fort Stedman was due to the nearness
of this fort to the Confederates’ salient Colquitt, the reduced number of wooden
obstructions protecting Fort Stedman, and the close proximity to a Union supply
depot behind the lines. If successful with this attack, Lee planned to have his
troops move north and south pushing the Yankees back and then moving toward
City Point approximately ten miles east. City Point was U.S. Grant’s
headquarters located at the confluence of the James and Appomattox Rivers. Also
located at City Point were the main Union supply base, wharves for ship
delivery, rail heads to move supplies to troops, reserve troops, and a troop
hospital. I will go into further detail regarding City Point in a later blog. 
For this surprise attack, Gordon was
to amass nearly 50% of Lee’s infantry – 19,700 men. The attack began before dawn as Rebel
sharpshooters and engineers disguised as deserters approached Fort Stedman
removing Federal pickets and wooden obstructions so the Confederate infantry
would not be delayed in their advance. Following this group of Rebels were
three hundred infantry whose assignment was to overwhelm the fort through
surprise and speed and opening a gap in the Northerners defenses. When General
Gordon arrived at the fort, he was amazed the plan had worked to open a 1,000
foot gap and immediately directed troops north and south. The Union cannon were
turned by the infiltrating Confederates and opened enfilading fire in each
direction. His success to the north was quickly stymied. His attention was then
turned to the south intending to take Fort Haskell. The defenders in Fort
Haskell returned cannon fire and attacked the charging Southern infantry with
canister cutting a path in their troops. Unbeknownst to Gordon, his cavalry
could not find a path to get through and a large portion of Pickett’s division
encountered rail transportation problems not arriving until mid-day, much too
late to participate in the battle. 
In the meantime the Union was
organizing and had closed the gap. Union artillery rained on Fort Stedman which
was now occupied by the Rebel forces. The Federals, in a counterattack, amassed
4,000 men in a semicircle for 1-1/2 miles around Fort Stedman and moved forward
pouring musket balls into the fort also. Gordon now realizing all was lost
pulled his remaining troops out and back to their original lines of defense. Four
hours of intense fighting produced nothing but casualties for the Rebels. Their
forces were thin as it were and the last thing Lee needed was less men and no
gained ground to show for it. The attack had failed. 
