Monday, November 18, 2013

THE PETERSBURG SIEGE


After failing to defeat The Army of Northern Virginia during his Overland Campaign in 1864, Union General Ulysses S. Grant moved his forces across the James River at City Point (now called Hopewell) and proceeded in his attempt to capture Richmond by taking and going through Petersburg. Knowing that if he could close off all the supply routes for the Confederates, he could squeeze them into submission. Petersburg was the great rail hub serving not only Richmond, but General Lee’s entire Rebel Army. 

Following his failure at Cold Harbor, the Union army, under the cover of darkness, marched south to the James River. After crossing, Grant threw his troops against Petersburg from June 15th through the 18th.  Because the Federal commanders under Grant did not press their positions and take the city, Lee was given enough time to move his army south to defend this important location. With the failed attempt on the Union’s part came a 292 day siege of Petersburg. This effort to take the city produced over 37 miles of entrenchments dug by each army, numerous battles, attacks, counter attacks, skirmishes, sharpshooters efforts, shelling of the city of Petersburg and its civilians, starvation of the Rebel forces, and casualties numbering 70,000.

Lee was, once again, numerically outnumbered. He was forced to leave troops to guard and protect Richmond, moving the larger portion south to face Grant, stop the attacks on Petersburg, and protect the many rail lines and roads that carried supplies to his troops. The problem for Lee was that Grant outnumbered him nearly 2 to 1. As Grant extended his line of troops southward around the eastern side of Petersburg and to cut off railroads, Lee would have to match his movement with a lesser number of men. Grant would move south and west. Lee would mirror his movement and dig in to keep Petersburg behind him and try to salvage rail lines. Grant would extend his line again, and Lee would do the same so that Grant could not turn the Rebel right flank. The process would happen time and time again. The difference was that Lee was continually thinning his troops to keep pace with Grant’s movements. This would, obviously, weaken Lee’s defenses as the Union grip would tighten. As everyone knew, it was now just a matter of time.

Along the eastern front of the entrenchments occurred the Battle of the Crater and the taking of Fort Stedman by the confederates, albeit only temporarily. In addition to these two major conflicts, there were constant sniper attacks along with artillery and rifle action. In many locations these trenches were yards, and sometimes only feet, apart.













The Crater Battle was a unique and unusual effort on the part of the Union troops. Opposite Lee’s lines was a brigade from the coal mining region of Pennsylvania that believed they could tunnel under the Rebel fortification known as Elliott’s Salient, plant explosives, and blow up that portion of the Confederate line thus giving the Federals direct access to Petersburg.  Under the command of Union General Ambrose Burnside, famous for his catastrophic blunder at Fredericksburg and his ineptness at the stone bridge at Antietam, he approved the tunneling plan presented to him by Lt. Col. Pleasants. Simply stated, the plan was to tunnel approximately 511 feet until it was under the Rebel fortification, “T” the tunnel for 75 feet, plant 8,000 pounds of explosives (320 kegs of gunpowder), seal the “T”, detonate the explosives, and rush the exposed area with ample infantry to secure the breach in the Confederate line. Generals Grant and Meade had little faith in this plan but allowed it mainly as a means to keep the troops busy during the long and boring siege.
Digging began in late June. During this time Burnside had a division of black troops trained to lead the assault. Anticipating the devastation and carnage that would occur with this incredible explosion, the division was instructed to not enter the crater, but to charge on either side of the rim fanning out to secure the breach.

Finally, on July 28, the powder charges were armed.  The attack was scheduled for the morning hours of July 30, prior to sunrise. On the 29th, Meade ordered Burnside not to use the black troops to lead the assault, in spite of two weeks of intensive training. Burnside’s protest of this fell on deaf ears and a division of white soldiers under the command of Brigadier General James Ledlie was selected by “luck of the draw”.  With no training or instructions these men would now lead the charge after the explosion. After some delay, the much anticipated explosion happened just before dawn creating a massive shower of earth, men, and artillery. The ensuing crater was 170 feet long, 100-120 feet wide, and at least 30 feet deep. Not only were the Confederates stunned by the event, but also the lead division of Yankees assigned for the attack. They were not briefed on what to expect or how to react and thus just froze for a time, having never seen anything this devastating before. The Federals took ten minutes to begin to move forward and, without the promised planks to bridge their earthworks, had to climb in and out of trenches before reaching no man’s land between the two lines. Not being instructed to rim the crater; they proceeded to charge into the large hole anticipating it to be a great rifle pit for them. Ledlie, the commander in charge of the lead division is said to have been far behind the lines, giving no direction and being drunk.
 Being stunned by the explosion also, which initially claimed 278 graybacks, it took Confederate Brigadier General William Mahone one hour to rally his troops around the rim of the crater. The following action was described as a “Turkey shoot” as the Yanks in the pit had no cover and nowhere to run. Not understanding the plan had failed, Burnside set the black division under Ferrero to charge the scene. Due to flanking fire from the Southerners, Ferrero’s division was forced into the pit also. For the next few hours, Mahone’s division accompanied by Major General Bushrod Johnson’s men and artillery pounded the defenseless Federals trapped in the crater. It was a massacre. Some Union soldiers did manage to climb from the pit and temporarily push the Confederate line, but were ultimately repulsed. Late in the battle, many of the black Union soldiers were killed by bayonet and musket fire even after surrendering to the Confederates. The entire plan was a fiasco; poorly executed, and halfheartedly supported by the commanding generals – Grant, Meade, and Burnside.

Casualties for the Federals amounted to nearly 4,000 while the Rebels incurred just fewer than 1,500.


 The attack on Fort Stedman, on March 25th, by the Rebels was Lee’s last ditch effort to break the nine month siege by the U.S. forces. As the siege wore on the Confederate forces diminished due to disease, desertion, starvation, and a shortage of supplies. By this time Lee’s troops were outnumbered by the Northerners nearly three to one and they were stretched the same mileage of entrenchments. It’s remarkable that the Southerners were still on the lines. Major General John B. Gordon, at the direction of General Lee, devised a plan to attack Fort Stedman in the early dawn hours of March 23rd.  Selecting Fort Stedman was due to the nearness of this fort to the Confederates’ salient Colquitt, the reduced number of wooden obstructions protecting Fort Stedman, and the close proximity to a Union supply depot behind the lines. If successful with this attack, Lee planned to have his troops move north and south pushing the Yankees back and then moving toward City Point approximately ten miles east. City Point was U.S. Grant’s headquarters located at the confluence of the James and Appomattox Rivers. Also located at City Point were the main Union supply base, wharves for ship delivery, rail heads to move supplies to troops, reserve troops, and a troop hospital. I will go into further detail regarding City Point in a later blog.
For this surprise attack, Gordon was to amass nearly 50% of Lee’s infantry – 19,700 men.  The attack began before dawn as Rebel sharpshooters and engineers disguised as deserters approached Fort Stedman removing Federal pickets and wooden obstructions so the Confederate infantry would not be delayed in their advance. Following this group of Rebels were three hundred infantry whose assignment was to overwhelm the fort through surprise and speed and opening a gap in the Northerners defenses. When General Gordon arrived at the fort, he was amazed the plan had worked to open a 1,000 foot gap and immediately directed troops north and south. The Union cannon were turned by the infiltrating Confederates and opened enfilading fire in each direction. His success to the north was quickly stymied. His attention was then turned to the south intending to take Fort Haskell. The defenders in Fort Haskell returned cannon fire and attacked the charging Southern infantry with canister cutting a path in their troops. Unbeknownst to Gordon, his cavalry could not find a path to get through and a large portion of Pickett’s division encountered rail transportation problems not arriving until mid-day, much too late to participate in the battle.

In the meantime the Union was organizing and had closed the gap. Union artillery rained on Fort Stedman which was now occupied by the Rebel forces. The Federals, in a counterattack, amassed 4,000 men in a semicircle for 1-1/2 miles around Fort Stedman and moved forward pouring musket balls into the fort also. Gordon now realizing all was lost pulled his remaining troops out and back to their original lines of defense. Four hours of intense fighting produced nothing but casualties for the Rebels. Their forces were thin as it were and the last thing Lee needed was less men and no gained ground to show for it. The attack had failed.

The casualties from this battle did much greater harm to the Confederates than to the Union. Losses for the Southerners amounted to 4,000 which Lee was not able to replace. The Union, on the other hand, lost only 1,044. Lee’s lines were greatly weakened and he knew the end was at hand. This was Lee’s last offensive action. One week later the Federals broke the Confederate lines, thus ending the Richmond-Petersburg Siege. On the evening of April 2, after Grant’s troops broke through, Lee started his evacuation. This event was preceded, on April 1, by Pickett’s inability to hold at Five Forks and the loss of the final rail head – the South Side Railroad.







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